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Oswald and Bennett: Insurance Law

INSURANCE LAW
I. RENEWAL OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY CONSTITUTES NEW
CONTRACT REQUIRING NEW OFFER OF UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE

In Webb v. South Carolina Insurance Co.' the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that renewal of an automobile insurance policy is a
new contract unless: (1) the expiring policy specifically provides that the
same terms shall remain in effect; and (2) the policy terms do not change
upon renewal. 2 If a policy renewal does constitute a new contract, the
insurer must make another valid offer of underinsured motorist (UIM)
coverage to the insured.3 The Webb holding modifies the South Carolina
Court of Appeals' decision in Knight v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.4 and overrules Simpson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.5
In April 1988, the respondent, Frederick L. Webb III, was injured
in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, Webb was a
resident of the household of his stepfather, Richard Pase. Pase held an
automobile insurance policy that he had purchased from Nationwide on
May 30, 1986. This policy contained a provision for renewal after the
initial six-month period. At the time of Pase's original application,
Nationwide offered UIM coverage, which Pase rejected. Pase renewed
the policy three times, but Nationwide never offered Pase UIM coverage
upon renewal. After Webb's accident, Nationwide refused to recognize
Webb's entitlement to UIM coverage under Pase's policy. Webb brought

1. 305 S.C. 211, 407 S.E.2d 635 (1991).
2. Id. at 213, 407 S.E.2d at 636.
3. Id. Under section 38-77-160 of the South Carolina Code, an automobile

insurer must offer optional underinsured motorist coverage to the insured. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 38-77-170 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1991).
4. 297 S.C. 20, 374 S.E.2d 520 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 203,
379 S.E.2d 133 (1989), and modifed by Webb, 305 S.C. 211, 407 S.E.2d 635. In
Knight the court of appeals held that renewal of an automobile insurance policy is a
new contract unless the expiring policy expressly provides for a renewal term. Id. at
23, 374 S.E.2d at 522.
5. 304 S.C. 137,403 S.E.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1991), overruledby Webb, 305 S.C.
211, 407 S.E.2d 635. The Simpson court found that, even if a renewal policy
contains certain terms different from those in the expired policy, the renewal does not
constitute a new contract as long as the original policy provided for renewal. Id. at
139-40, 403 S.E.2d at 168.
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this declaratory judgment action to establish his entitlement to UIM
coverage under his stepfather's policy. 6
The trial court granted summary judgment for Webb, ruling that,
under Knight, Nationwide was required to offer UIM coverage at each
renewal. 7 Nationwide argued on appeal that the renewal provisions in
the expiring contract provided for a continuing policy under the Knight
exception. 8 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling, but
modified the Knight holding. 9 The Webb court found that Nationwide's
renewal was a new contract requiring a valid offer of UIM coverage."1
Pase's original policy provided that renewal was subject to Nationwide's policy rates and rating plans at the time of renewal." The
court stated that the policy "specifically contemplates upon renewal a
renegotiation of an essential term of the contract, the premium rate.""2
Therefore, because the terms of the policy could change upon renewal,
the court reasoned that this renewal was a new contract. 1s
The rationale underlying the Webb court's holding indicates the
importance of the intent of the contracting parties for purposes of
determining the legal effect of subsequent renewals of an insurance
policy. Although the Webb opinion does not expressly mention the
parties' intent, both factors that the court considered in deciding whether
the renewal was a new or a continuing contract actually concern

6. Webb, 305 S.C. at 212, 407 S.E.2d at 635.
7. Id. at 212, 407 S.E.2d at 636.

8. Id. at 213, 407 S.E.2d at 636.
9. See id. The Webb court restricted Knight's exception for renewal provisions.

Id. For a discussion of the Knight holding, see supra note 4.
10. Webb, 305 S.C. at 214, 407 S.E.2d at 636.
11. Id. Nationwide's general policy conditions stated:
"Your policy is written for a six-month policy period. We will renew it

for successive policy periods, subject to the following conditions:
a) Renewal will be in accordance with policy forms, rules, rates and
rating plans in use by us at the time.
b) All premiums or premium installment payments must be paid when
due, whether payable directly to us or through any premium finance plan.

c) Neither you, nor anyone who lives in your household, nor anyone who
customarily operates a motor vehicle covered by your policy has his
driver's license suspended or revoked during the policy period."
Id. at 213-14, 407 S.E.2d at 636 (quoting policy).
12. Id. at 214, 407 S.E.2d at 636. A change in the policy premium alone is
sufficient to reclassify a renewal policy as a new contract. Id.
13. Id. Because this rationale conflicts with the court of appeals' holding in
Simpson, the supreme court overruled that decision. Id. at 213, 407 S.E.2d at 635.

For a discussion of the holding in Simpson, see supra note 5.
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intent.14 For example, if the parties intend a policy renewal to be
considered a continuing contract, the original contract will contain a
renewal term and the renewal policy will contain a manifestation of that
intent through terms identical to those in the original policy. This intentbased approach is consistent with that of other jurisdictions. 5
The Webb holding leaves little room for a renewal of an automobile
insurance policy to be considered a continuing policy. Accordingly, to
protect itself against a claim for UIM coverage, an insurer should offer
this coverage at each renewal under section 38-77-160 of the South
Carolina Code16 and in accordance with the holding
in State Farm
7
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wannamaker.'
Julie A. Oswald

II. COURT OF APPEALS REviEWs DEFINITION OF UNDERINSURED
MOTOR VEHICLE

In Purvis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." the
South Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the definition of the term
"underinsured motor vehicle." The court held that the vehicle in which
the appellants' deceased daughter was a passenger was not an underinsured motor vehicle under the statutory definition applicable at the time

14. See supra text accompanying note 2.
15. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
68 P.2d 555, 556 (Colo. 1937) (stating that renewal of a fidelity policy is a new

contract unless the original policy shows parties' contrary intent); Reserve Life Ins.
Co. v. LaFollette, 323 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Wis. 1982) (finding that a renewal of a
health policy is a new contract unless parties express different intent in original
contract). See generally 18 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §

68.40 (2d ed. 1983) (describing intent of parties ascertained from insurance policy
as dispositive in determining whether renewal is a new or continuing contract); 44
C.J.S. Insurance § 283 (1945) (discussing intent exception to general rule regarding
renewals of insurance contracts).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-160 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1991).
17. 291 S.C. 518, 354 S.E.2d 555 (1987). "Mhe statute mandates the insured
to be provided with adequate information, and in such a manner, as to allow the
insured to make an intelligent decision of whether to accept or reject the coverage."
Id. at 521, 354 S.E.2d at 556; see also Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
303 S.C. 321, 400 S.E.2d 492 (1991) (discussing elements of an effective offer of
UIM coverage).
18. 304 S.C. 283, 403 S.E.2d 662 (Ct. App.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 304
S.C. 283, 284, 403 S.E.2d 662, 662 (1991).
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of the accident. 1 9 The Purvis court chronicled South Carolina's voyage
from being an "excess" coverage state to being a "reduction" coverage
state and then back to being an "excess" coverage state.20
The appellants' daughter was killed on May 16, 1988 when the
vehicle in which she was riding collided with a tree. The driver's insurer
paid the driver's policy limit of $25,000 to the appellants. The appellants
then filed a claim for benefits under their underinsured motorist policy
with the respondent ("State Farm").2 State Farm denied coverage and
asserted that the vehicle in which the appellants' daughter was a

19. Id. at 284, 403 S.E.2d at 663. The relevant statutory definition of underinsured motor vehicle is discussed infra note 33. In State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Horry, 304 S.C. 165, 403 S.E.2d 318 (1991), the South Carolina
Supreme Court expressly approved and adopted the Purvis opinion. Id. at 167, 403
S.E.2d at 319 (1991).
Additionally, the court in Purvis rejected, as without merit, the appellants'
secondary challenge that the insurer's offer of underinsurance coverage was
misleading and did not provide an adequate explanation of the changes in underinsurance coverage. Purvis, 304 S.C. at 289, 403 S.E.2d at 666.
20. Purvis, 304 S.C. at286-88, 403 S.E.2d at 664-65. Under "excess" coverage,
the insured receives underinsured motorist benefits from her own policy if the at-fault
driver's liability coverage is less than the insured's actual damages. The insured
receives the difference between her actual damages and the at-fault driver's liability
policy limits, but not to exceed the insured's underinsured motorist policy limits. Id.
at 285, 403 S.E.2d at 664.
In contrast, under "reduction" coverage, any benefits from the insured's
underinsured motorist policy are reduced by the amount the insured recovers from
the at-fault driver. Therefore, the insured receives benefits only if the policy limits
of the insured's underinsured motorist coverage exceed the at-fault driver's liability
policy limits. No benefits are available if the insured's underinsured motorist
coverage is equal to or less than the at-fault driver's liability limits. Id.
The purpose of the "excess" coverage approach is to allow an insured to
recover as much of her actual damages as possible. Whereas, the "reduction"
coverage approach allows the insured to recover damages only up to the amount that
she sets as an acceptable liability minimum. See generally, 8C JOHN A. APPLEMAN
& JEAN APPLEMAN, INsuRANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5071.45 (1981).

Several jurisdictions follow the excess coverage approach. See, e.g., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304.39-320(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65B.49(4a) (West Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.22.030 (West Supp.
1992). However, other states use the reduction coverage approach. See, e.g., ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §
27-7-5-5(c) (Bums Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-578 (1988); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:28-1.1(e) (West Supp. 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2)
(Anderson 1989); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-1(2)(b) (West Supp. 1992).

21. The limit on the appellants' underinsured motorist policy was $25,000 per
person. Record at 2.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/13
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passenger was not an underinsured motor vehicle within the appellants'
policy.2
The trial court denied underinsured motorist benefits to the
appellants. On appeal, the appellants argued that the prior judicial
interpretations of the term "underinsured motor vehicle"' should
control instead of the itatutory definition that was in effect on the date
of the accident.24
The South Carolina Underinsured Motorist Act,' enacted in 1978,
provides that automobile insurance carriers shall offer optional underinsured motorist coverage to the insured for damages sustained in excess
of the liability coverage of an at-fault motorist.26 However, the General
Assembly did not define "underinsured motor vehicle" in the Act;
therefore, it was uncertain whether South Carolina was an "excess"
coverage state or a "reduction" coverage state. 27
The South Carolina Supreme Court eliminated this uncertainty in
Gambrell v. Travelers Insurance Cos.2" and Garris v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.29 In Gambrell the supreme court held that the underinsured
motorist statute was intended to provide coverage when the injured
party's actual damages exceeded the liability limits of the at-fault
party.3" Additionally, the Gambrell court stated that there was no
statutory requirement that the insured's underinsured motorist limits
exceed the liability limits of the at-fault party. 3 ' In Garris the supreme

22. Purvis, 304 S.C. at 284, 403 S.E.2d at 663.

23. E.g., Garris v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723 (1984)
(declaring that underinsured motorist coverage in South Carolina is excess coverage)
(citing Gambrell v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983)). See

infra text accompanying notes 28-32 for a discussion of Garris and Gambrell.
24. Purvis, 304 S.C. at 284, 403 S.E.2d at 663. The definition of underinsured

motor vehicle that was in effect at the time of the accident in Purvis is found in Act
of June 4, 1987, § 21, 1987 S.C. Acts 166 (originally codified at S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 56-9-810 (Law. Co-op. 1976)) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30(14)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-160 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1991) (originally
codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).

26. Id.
27. Purvis, 304 S.C. at 285, 403 S.E.2d at 664. The definitions of excess
coverage and reduction coverage are discussed supra note 20.
28. 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983).
29. 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723 (1984).

30. Gambrell, 280 S.C. at 71, 310 S.E.2d at 816, quoted in Purvis, 304 S.C. at
286, 403 S.E.2d at 664.
31. Id.
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court confirmed its decision in Gambrell,
squarely establishing South
32
Carolina as an "excess" coverage state.
However, on June 4, 1987, the General Assembly created the state's
first statutory definition of "underinsured motor vehicle. "3 This
definition effectively abrogated the Gambrell court's definition and made
South Carolina a "reduction" coverage state.34
The appellants argued that the holdings in Gambrell and Garris
governed the definition of "underinsured motor vehicle. "' However,
the court rejected this argument because the appellants renewed their
underinsured motorist policy on November 14, 1987, after the effective
date of the 1987 statutory definition. 36 The court noted that the 1987
statutory language clearly expressed the General Assembly's intent to
transform South Carolina from an "excess" coverage to a "reduction"
coverage state and that accepting the appellants' contention would nullify
the purpose of the new statute. 37 Therefore, the court construed the

32. Garris,280 S.C. at 153, 311 S.E.2d at 725-26, quoted in Purvis, 304 S.C.
at 286, 403 S.E.2d at 664-65.
33. Act of June 4, 1987, § 21, 1987 S.C. Acts 166 (originally codified at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-9-810 (Law. Co-op. 1976)) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 38-77-30(14) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)). The Act provided that:
"Underinsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle ...[with] liability
insurance

. .

.[in an] amount [that] . . .(a) is less than the limit for

underinsured motorist coverage under the insured's policy; or (b) has been
reduced by payments to persons, other than the insured, injured in the
accident to an amount less than the limit for underinsured motorist
coverage under the insured's policy.
Id.
34. Purvis, 304 S.C. at 287, 403 S.E.2d at 665. Finally, on August 1, 1989, the
General Assembly amended the definition of underinsured motor vehicle to reestablish South Carolina as an "excess" coverage state. Id. The amended statute
provides that an ."'[u]nderinsured motor vehicle' means a motor vehicle ... [with]

liability insurance... [in an] amount [that] is less than the amount of the insureds'
damages." S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30(14) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). This is the
current definition in South Carolina. Purvis, 304 S.C. at 288, 403 S.E.2d at 665.
35. Purvis, 304 S.C. at 284, 403 S.E.2d at 663.
36. Id. at 288, 403 S.E.2d at 665. The effective date of the Act was June 4,
1987. Id. at 287, 403 S.E.2d at 665.
37. Id. The court stated that it must presume that "'the legislature intended to
accomplish something with each statute and not to engage in futile action.'" Id. at
288, 403 S.E.2d at 666 (quoting Charleston Television, Inc. v. South Carolina
Budget & Control Bd., 296 S.C. 444, 458, 373 S.E.2d 892, 900 (Ct. App. 1988),
rev'd on othergrounds, 301 S.C. 468, 392 S.E.2d 671 (1990)).
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Horry, 304 S.C. 165, 403
S.E.2d 318 (1991), the supreme court noted that the enactment of section 38-73-1105
of the South Carolina Code supports the Purvis decision. Horry, 304 S.C. at 168-69,
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/13
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language of the statute according to its literal meaning and affirmed the
trial court.38 According to the literal meaning of the old section 56-9810, the vehicle in which the appellants' daughter died was not an
"underinsured motor vehicle" because the appellants' underinsured
motorist coverage was not greater than the at-fault party's liability
coverage.39
Although the court's decision in Purvis imposed a harsh result on the
appellants, the court's reasoning is sound in light of the statute's clear
language. The court properly determined that "reduction" coverage
applied to underinsured motor vehicles at the time of the decedent's
death. Nevertheless, South Carolina now has returned to the "excess"
coverage approach to underinsured motorist insurance that existed under
Gambrell and Garris.4 °
Brian W. Bennett

403 S.E.2d at 319-20. Section 38-73-1105 requires an insurer to reduce its
underinsured motorist coverage rates before it can use the statutory definition of
underinsured motor vehicle. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-73-1105 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
The enactment of § 38-73-1105 in connection with the 1987 statutory definition of

"underinsured motor vehicle" indicates the legislature's intent to change the thenexisting judicial definition. See Horry, 304 S.C. at 168-69, 403 S.E.2d at 319-20.
38. Purvis304 S.C. at 288-89, 403 S.E.2d at 665-66 (citing Citizens & S. Sys.,
Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 717 (1984)); see also
Wright v. Colleton County Sch. Dist., 301 S.C. 282, 287, 391 S.E.2d 564, 567

(1990) (stating that courts must apply terms of statute according to their literal
meaning).
39. Purvis, 304 S.C. at 284, 403 S.E.2d at 663.

40. See S.C. CODEANN. § 38-77-30(14) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). This section
is discussed supranote 34.
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